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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Every precaution should be taken to prevent the original
introduction of such material. And where its use has been
permitted, the results should be carefully examined upon ap-
peal, to ensure that the judgment has not been influenced
thereby.
MASTER AND SERVANT
EFFECT OF "NO RIDER'S" INSTRUCTIONS
Plaintiff's intestate was killed while riding in defend-
ant's truck as a guest of defendant's servant. Defendant
company had promulgated rules prohibiting riders. Judgment
for plaintiff on finding an implied waiver of rules and that
death resulted from servant's gross negligence and unlawful
acts while operating the truck within the scope of employ-
ment. Held: Reversed. The evidence was insufficient to
support finding of an implied waiver. Monroe Motor Ex-
press v. Jackson, 38 S.E. (2d) 863 (Ga. App. 1.946).
The principal case presents the question of whether a
master owes a legal duty to the unauthorized invitees of a
servant truck driver. No duty is created where the serv-
ant's act of driving is not in furtherance of the master's
business. And this is true, regardless of the presence or
absence of authority to invite third persons,' But a master
does owe a duty where scope of employment and authority to
invite third persons are co-existent.2 In the principal case,
the servant's tortious driving was in furtherance of the mas-
ter's ends, but authority to invite third persons to ride was
1. See Craig v. Tucker, 264 Ill. App. 521 (1932) where principal
was held not liable for injuries sustained by authorized guest
when agent drove vehicle in pursuit of personal pleasure. A
different result might obtain in jurisdictions having an "imputed
negligence" statute. In this respect, see Goodwin v. Goodwin,
5 Cal. App.(2d) 644, 43 P.(2d) 223 (1935), construing the
"guest" statute with a statute imputing negligence of drive to
owner of vehicle.
To complete the picture of the interplay of authority and
scope of employment, see Robertson v. Armour Co., 129 Me. 501,
152 Atl. 407 (1930), holding master not liable to unauthorized
guest of servant for servant's negligence while driving truck for
personal ends.
2. Bummer v. Liberty Laundry Co., 48 Cal. App. 648, 120 P.(2d)
672 (1941); Radutz v. Tribune Co., 293 Ill. App. 315, 12 N.E.
(2d) 224 (1938); Petit v. Swift and Co., 203 Minn. 270, 281
N.W. 44 (1938); Krull v. Triangle Dairy, 59 Ohio App. 107, 17
N.E.(2d) 291 (1935); Eisenhower v. Hall Motor Transit Co., 351
Pa. 200, 40 A.(2d) 458 (1945).
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absent. It is frankly conceded by the Georgia court that the
operation of the vehicle was within the scope of employ-
ment. The implication of the court's holding is that there-
fore the master owes no duty, conditional or absolute, to the
servant's guest. This seems clearly erroneous. The reasoning
is violative of the fundamental concept that a master is liable
for the torts of his servant committed within the scope of
employment. Generally, the courts that have found an ab-
sence of duty on the part of the master have held that the
rider has no right to infer that the servant may transport
guests.3  They conclude that with respect to the rider, the
servant never returns to the scope of employment after ex-
tending the unauthorized invitation.4 As a basis for deny-
ing liability the logic seems fallacious. When the driver re-
sumes his journey after the invitation, he is again in his
master's employment, doing his master's business.5 He can-
not be consistently within and without his employment at
one and the same time.6 Similarly, it is difficult to see that
the absence of a right to infer authority should completely
negate the master's duty to the servant's guest. A more
logical approach is to reason that the legal relationship cre-
3. For example, it is said that the rider "should know of this ob-
vious lack of authority from the position the man holds and the
character of his employment," Reis v. Mosebach, 33 Pa. 412, 12
A.(2d) 37,39. In Dempsey v. Test, 98 Ind. App. 533, 184 N.E.
909 (1934), the appellate court cited with approval, p. 541,542,
the language of the Massachusetts court in O'Leary v. Fash, 245
Mass. 123, 140 N.E. 282,283,284 (1934) as follows: "It is an
obvious consequence of the principal's conduct in hiring a man
to drive a truck in the delivery of freight that the public have
no right to infer and do not understand the principal to confer
upon such a driver the authority to transport guests .... So
far as concerns the plaintiff and her presence in his truck it
is in law a matter of indifference to the defendant whether the
driver of the truck exercised due care or was grossly negligent
or was guilty of wanton or reckless conduct." See also Thomas
v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 177 Ark. 963, 9 S.W.(2d) 1 (1928)
and Greerson v. Bailey, 167 Ga. 638, 146 S.E. 490 (1929). In
the latter case, the court pointed out that in allowing the rider
to remain, the servant was acting without the scope of his em-
ployment. This reasoning, it is submitted, overlooks the fac-
tor which proximately causes the injury-that being the act of
driving which is in furtherance of the object of employment.
4. See n. 3, supra.
5. Kuharski v. Somers Motor Lines, Inc., 43 A. (2d) 777 (Conn. 1945).
6. This is not a -case involving the question of incidental negligence
such as a servant smoking in non-hazardous surroundings. Here
the very act complained of was the one for which the servant
was hired, that is, the driving of the vehicle.
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ated between the master and the servant's unauthorized guest,
is that of chattel owner-trespasser. The duty then arising in
the master through his servant, is to refrain from recklessly
or wantonly injuring the trespasser.7
The effect of "guest" statutes in determining the extent
of the master's duty remains to be considered. Where the
servant's invitation is authorized, the nature of the master's
duty is conditioned by the statute. This is dependent, how-
ever, upon a determination of the rider's status.8 Where the
master receives some material benefit from the rider's pres-
ence on the vehicle, the rider's status is not that of a guest.,
Where, as in the principal case, the invitation is unauthorized,
the "guest" statute should have no direct effect on the nature
7. Jewell Tea Co., Inc. v. Sklivis, 231 Ala. 490, 165 So. 824 (1936);
Kuharski v. Somers Motor Lines, Inc., 43 A. (2d) 777 (Conn.
1945); Bobos v. Krey Packing Co., 217 Mo. 108, 296 S.W. 157;
Barall Food Stores v. Bennett, 194 Okla. 508, 153 P.(2d) 106
(1944).
8. As to what constitutes a guest under the Indiana "Guest" state,
See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stitzer, 220 Ind. 180, 41 N.E.(2d)
133 (1942); Albert McGann Securities Co., Inc. v. Coen, 114 Ind.
App. 60, 48 N.E. (2d) 58 (1943) ; Swinney v. Roler, 113 Ind. App.
367, 47 N.E.(2d) 846 (1943); Lee Bros., Inc. v. Jones, 114 Ind.
App. 688, 54 N.E. (2d) 108 (1944). It is to be noted that through-
out these cases runs the concept of present material gain to the
host as the determinative factor of whether the invitee becomes
a passenger to whom a higher duty is owed rather than a guest
under the statute.
At common law the duty owed the guest was that of reason-
able care. See Munson v. Rupker, 96 Ind. App. 15, 148 N.E. 169
(1925) decided prior to the passage of the "guest" statute. See
also Deskins v. Warden, 122 W. Va. 644, 12 S.E.(2d) 47 (1940).
As for the application of respondeat superior to the guest sit-
uation prior to the "Guest" statute, see Willi v. Shaefer Hitch-
cock, 53 Idaho 367, 25 P. (2d) 167 (1933).
Subsequent to the enactment of the "Guest" statute, the duty
owed by a principal to his guest riding with the principal's agent
was dependent on more culpabble conduct on the part of the-
servant. Brummer v. Libert Laundry Co., 48 Cal. App. 648, 120
P.(2d) 672 (1941); Denton v. Midwest Dairy Products Corpora-
tion, 284 Ill. 279, 1 N.E.(2d) 807 (1936); Jay v. Holman,
106 Ind. App. 413, 20 N.E.(2d) 656 (1939). For the same re-
sult where the effect of the guest statute has been reached throughjudicial decision, see Wilder v. Steel Products Co., 57 Ga. App.
255, 195 S.E. 226 (1938).
9. See Krull v. Triangle Dairy, 59 Ohio App. 107, 17 N.E. (2d) 291(1935) and Radutz v. Tribune Co., 293 Ill. App. 315, 12 N.E.
(2d) 224 (1938), where the rider was aboard the vehicle to render
assistance to the driver and the effect of the "guest" statute on his
right to recover was not considered. It would seem, in such
instances, that the master is receiving "consideration" from the
rider's presence on the vehicle and the rider has the status of




of the master's duty. The resultant legal relationship created
between the master and rider is not that of host-guest.l ° In
some instances, the degree of the servant's tort necessary to
make the master liable would be the same regardless of
whether there was authority to extend the invitation."
PATENTS
CONSENT DECREES AND RES JUDICATA
In a suit for infringement of a patent, the defendants
raised the issue of patent validity. An earlier suit between
the same parties for infringement of the same patent resulted
in a consent decree in plaintiff's favor. Held: The consent
decree did not estop defendants from questioning the validity
of the patent in this suit. The patent is invalid., Addresso-
graph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper et al., 156 F. (2d) 483
(C.C.A. 2nd, 1946) . 2
Although a consent decree has been interpreted to be
but a contract between the parties, 3 the federal rule now
10. Thomas v. Southern Lumber Co., 181 S.W.(2d) 111 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1944); Lassiter v. Shell Oil Co., 188 Wash. 371, 62 P. (2d)
1096 (1944).
11. In Thomas v. Southern Lumber Co., supra n.10, the court said,
p. 115: " . . . the legal duty which the owner or operator owes a
gratuitous guest is practically the same as that which the owner
of real property used for private purposes owes to a mere licensee.
Hence it appears immaterial in this case from the standpoint of
Hammon's (the employer's) liability for the torts of Frederick(the driver) whether Nolan Thomas (the rider) be regarded as a
trespasser, licensee, or guest in the truck because the test of
liability would be practically the same in either of these contin-
gencies."
A problem of privilege might arise in those jurisdictions where
the duty owed to a gratuitous guest by the driver differs from
that owed to a trespasser by the master. If the duty owed by the
driver to his guest were less than that owed to. a trespasser by
the master, would the driver's non-liability under the statute cloak
the master with immunity? O'Leary v. Fash, 245 Mass. 123, 140
N.E. 282 (1923), in observing that the rights of the trespasser-
guest to recover against the master should be no higher than his
rights against the host-driver would seem to answer the question
in the affirmative. Richard's v. Parker, 19 Tenn. App 645, 93
S.W.(2d 639 (1935), indicates that the guest of the principal
is entitled to no greater rights against the agent than against the
principal under the "guest" statute. It would seem logical that
the converse should be true.
1. Clark, J., dissenting. Majority opinion by Woodbury, Swan, J.J.
2. This is in affirmance of the district court. Addressograph-Mul-
tigraph Corp. v. Cooper et al., 60 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
3. Hodgson v. Vroom, 266 Fed. 267 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1920); 3 Freeman,
Judgments (5th Ed. 1925) §1350.
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